The progress in artificial intelligence enables us to conceive adaptive systems whose characteristics are nearer and nearer to those of living beings. These characteristics though depend on ingenious choices by the designer of these systems: Initial conditions, parameters, optimisation functions, gradient and measure of fitness within the environment. Nevertheless, in living systems which are non-finalist, there are no programmers or designers to conceive of such ingenious choices. Our paper “Self-Programming Machines (I)” presents a non-finalist model since initial states and functions (...) are randomly chosen at the beginning and once and for all. In spite of the fact that they are non-finalist, these machines always stabilise at fixed points when they are connected to an external process. (shrink)

Very often, living beings seem able to change their functioning when external conditions vary. In order to study this property, we have devised abstract machines whose internal organisation changes whenever the external conditions vary. The internal organisations of these machines, are as simple as possible, functions of discrete variables. We call such machines self-modifying automata.These machines stabilise after any transient steps when they go indefinitely through a loop called p-cycle or limit cycle of length p. More often than not, the (...) p in the cycle is equal to one and the cycle reduces to a fixed point. (shrink)

In an attempt to discover the properties of the nervous system, we imagined the conditions under which a machine would be able to construct its own program and from which emerged the model of Self Modifying Automata. We demonstrated the unicity of the SMA model, their convergence in a p-cycle and, in this case, the SELFREFERENCE of a stabilised SMA, their adaptability when connected to a deterministic world. The SMA reaches its p-cycle very quickly and the most probable length of (...) the -cycle is 1. (shrink)

One of the most important features of living beings that seems universal is perhaps their ability to be modified in a functional way.In order to modelize this characteristic, we designed automata with a finite number of instantaneous internal descriptions, with input(s) and output(s) and which are able to be functionally modified.

Contents: Foreword. Wolfgang BALZER and C. ULISES MOULINES: Introduction. José A. DÍEZ CALZADA: Structuralist Analysis of Theories of Fundamental Measurement. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA and Pedro REYES: The Theory of Finite Games in Extensive Form. Hans Joachim BURSCHEID und Horst STRUVE: The Theory of Stochastic Fairness - its Historical Development, Formulation and Justification. Wolfgang BALZER and Richard MATTESSICH: Formalizing the Basis of Accounting. Werner DIEDERICH: A Reconstruction of Marxian Economics. Bert HAMMINGA and Wolfgang BALZER: The Basic Structure of Neoclassical (...) General Equilibrium Theory. Klaus MANHART: Balance Theories: Two Reconstructions and the Problem of Intended Applications. Rainer WESTERMANN: Festinger's Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Structuralist Theory-Net. Rainer REISENZEIN: Wundt's Three-Dimensional Theory of Emotion. Pablo LORENZANO: Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics. Hinne HETTEMA and Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Formalisation of the Periodic Table. C. ULISES MOULINES: The Basic Core of Simple Equilibrium Thermodynamics. Thomas BARTELBORTH: An Axiomatization of Classical Electrodynamics. Author's Index. Subject Index. (shrink)

This chapter discusses author's view a Thomistic‐like dualism. Next, it lays out the details of his position and he argues that it has certain advantages over physicalist treatments of the human person, and, to a lesser degree, over alternate versions of substance dualism. Then, he responds to some objections against his position. He accepts constituent realism regarding properties (and relations), according to which properties (and relations) are universals that, when exemplified (and they need not be to exist), become constituents of (...) the ordinary particulars that have them. Furthermore, with the Thomistic framework in mind, the chapter offers his view of a human person. Finally, there is the argument that attempts to show that the unity of consciousness cannot be explained if one is a brain, because a brain is just an aggregate of different physical (separable) parts. (shrink)

After describing Heidegger's critique of metaphysics as ontotheology, I unpack the metaphysical assumptions of several transhumanist philosophers. I claim that they deploy an ontology of power and that they also deploy a kind of theology, as Heidegger meant it. I also describe the way in which this metaphysics begets its own politics and ethics. In order to transcend the human condition, they must transgress the human.

I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism – minimally, the view that we are spiritual substances that have bodies – based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking matter is metaphysically (...) possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept of God's being a divine spirit. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Section One: The Backdrop for Locating Consciousness in a Naturalist Ontology Section Two: The AC Section Three: John Searle and Contingent Correlation Section Four: Timothy O'Connor and Emergent Necessitation Section Five: Colin McGinn and Mysterian “Naturalism” Conclusion Further Reading References.

The ‘decapitation gambit’ holds that, if physical decapitation normally entails the death of the human being, then physiological decapitation, evident in cases of total brain failure, entails the death of the human being. This argument has been challenged by Franklin Miller and Robert Truog, who argue that physical decapitation does not necessarily entail the death of human beings and that therefore, by analogy, artificially sustained human bodies with total brain failure are living human beings. They thus challenge the current neurological (...) criterion for determining death and argue for a return to the traditional criterion of the irreversible loss of circulation and respiration. In this paper, I defend the decapitation gambit and total brain failure as a criterion for determining death against Miller and Truog's criticism. (shrink)

We argue that Aged Residential Care (ARC) facilities should be allowed to create and adopt an informed “No Chest Compression” (NCC) policy. Potential residents are informed before admission that staff will not provide chest compressions to a pulseless resident. All residents would receive standard choking care, and a fully discussed advance directive would be utilized to determine if the resident wanted a one-minute trial of rescue breaths (to clear their airway) or utilization of the automatic defibrillator in case of arrest. (...) The benefits of chest compressions for residents in ARC are dubious, and the burdens are high. For frail elderly people without a pulse, chest compressions are arguably unethical because the chance of benefit is minuscule, the procedure is violent, painful, and challenging to perform correctly, and procedures detract from a peaceful end of life. These burdens fall on residents, their families, ARC facilities providers, and society. We further argue that limitations on universal invasive resuscitation, such as advance directives, need to be more consistently sought and applied. The goals of an informed NCC policy are twofold: removing added suffering from a person’s end-of-life experience and increasing ARC residents’ understanding of the burdens of ineffective treatments for pulselessness. (shrink)

Dubourg and Baumard's paper takes a different, and fruitful, approach to the study of imaginary worlds than what is usually found in Media Studies, but omits certain circumstances and influences that shaped their history; this article argues that psychological or behavioral factors are not enough to explain the growth of imaginary worlds, even as they may be important influences.

There are two tasks for any adequate philosophy of mind: (1) articulate one’s position and explain why dualism is the commonsense view; (2) defend one’s position. I believe that there is an argument that simultaneously satisfies both desiderata in a non–ad hoc way and, thus, the argument can thereby claim the virtue of theoretical simplicity in its favor. In what follows, I shall present the argument and defend its most crucial premise, respond to three criticisms that have been raised against (...) it, and draw out one dialectical implication of the argument. (shrink)

During the 1970s, prenatal screening technologies were in their infancy, but were being swiftly harnessed to uncover and prevent spina bifida. The historical rise of this screening process and prevention programme is analysed in this paper, and the role of ethical debates in key studies, editorials and letters reported in the Lancet, and other related texts and governmental documents between 1972 and 1983, is considered. The silence that surrounded rigorous ethical debate served to highlight where discussion lay—namely, within the justifications (...) offered for the prevention of spina bifida, and the efficacy and benefits of screening. In other words, the ethical justification for screening and prevention of spina bifida, when the authors are not explicitly interested in ethics, is considered. These justifications held certain notions of disability as costly to society, with an imperative to screen and prevent spina bifida for the good of the society. (shrink)

The remarkable modern speculations concerning non-Euclidean sorts of space, of which Prof. Helmholtz gave some account in No. III. of MIND, are likely to be hailed as one of the chief difficulties with which the Kantian theory of space will have to deal. Digital edition compiled by Gabriele Dörflinger. Heidelberg University Library.

A widely adopted approach to end-of-life ethical questions fails to make explicit certain crucial metaphysical ideas entailed by it and when those ideas are clarified, then it can be shown to be inadequate. These metaphysical themes cluster around the notions of personal identity, personhood and humanness, and the metaphysics of substance. In order to clarify and critique the approach just mentioned, I focus on the writings of Robert N. Wennberg as a paradigm case by, first, stating his views of personal (...) identity, humanness, personhood, and the relations among them; second, offering a comparison of a view of humans as substances (understood in the classic interpretation of Aristotle and Aquinas) vs. a view of humans as property-things; third, applying the metaphysical distinctions surfaced in the second section towards a critique of Wennberg. (shrink)

Human conflict and its resolution is obviously a subject of great practical importance. Equally obviously, it is a vast subject, ranging from total war at one end of the spectrum to negotiated settlement at its other end. The literature on the subject is correspondingly vast and, in recent times, technical, thanks to the valuable contributions made to it by game theorists, economists, and writers on industrial and international relations. In this essay, however, I shall discuss only one familiar form of (...) conflict-resolution. There is room for such a discussion, because philosophers have lately neglected compromise, despite the interest shown in it by the aforementioned experts, and despite the classic treatments of it by Halifax, Burke and Morley. Truly, ‘…compromise is not so widely discussed by philosophers as one might expect’, and ‘…the idea of compromise has been largely neglected by Anglo-American jurisprudence’. (shrink)

Onderwerp en gezegde, door D. M. Bakker.--Enkele opmerkingen over het Godsbegrip van Justinus Martyr, door J. den Boeft.--Heidegger, Descartes, Luther, door J. van der Hoeven.--"Geschichtlichkeit" bij Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, door G. Horsman.--Menselijke ontmaskering en Bijbels démasqué , door R. Huson.--Kleine geschiedenis van het begrip "niets" in de antieke wijsbegeerte (tot e met de Sofisten en Plato), door P. A. Meijer.--De structuur van opvoeden en opvoedkunde, door J. W. Mojet.--Individualiteit in de fysica, door M. D. (...) Stafleu. (shrink)

Graham Oppy had criticized my argument for God from consciousness (AC) in my recent book ’Consciousness and the Existence of God’ (N.Y.: Routledge, 2008). In this article I offer a rejoinder to Oppy. Specifically, I respond to his criticisms of my presentation of three forms of AC, and interact with his claims about theism, consciousness and emergent chemical properties.

Philosophy is experiencing a resurgence of property (PD) and generic substance dualism (SD). One important argument for SD that has played a role in this resurgence is some version of a modal argument. Until recently, premise (3) of the argument (Possibly, I exist, and no wholly physical objects exist.) has garnered most of the attention by critics. However, more recently, the focus has also been on (2) (Wholly physical objects are essentially, wholly, and intrinsically physical and wholly spiritual substances are (...) essentially, wholly, and intrinsically immaterial.). Andrew Bailey has provided one of the best criticisms of (2) on offer. In what follows, I present and clarify one form of the argument and defend premise (2) by responding to important defeaters proffered by Andrew Bailey and his contingent physicalism. (shrink)

Foundations of Humanism is a primer on secular humanism written by one of the leading figures in the movement. J.P. van Praag writes that the modern world is shaped by a central paradox: the technology that provides us with unprecedented possibilities at the same time imposes an oppressive organization on society. This organization, with its trappings of overspecialization and overcentralization, promotes feelings of impotence and alienation and a spirit of rebellion, especially in the young. In this book, van Praag examines (...) the ways in which the philosophy of humanism can be applied to this paradox of modern life. Humanism holds that the purpose of life is life itself. Van Praag demonstrates how, through the application of this principle, the paradox can be transcended and how personal fulfillment and social creativity can be achieved. Foundations of Humanism is designed to give the reader a comprehensive view of secular humanism, including its historical roots in classical Greece and the Renaissance, its elaboration as a formal philosophy, and its practical aspects as a social philosophy. Finally, it explores the application of humanist principles in counseling and education. (shrink)

During the first years of the post-war era, many French scientists travelled in the United States. As they looked for a reference to be used in rebuilding their own scientific landscape, their diaries say as much about the rise of the American biomedical complex as they do about their perception of research in the country. In order to illustrate how the French biologists adopted, competed with, or challenged the American model and how transatlantic exchanges played a critical role in the (...) molecularization of the life sciences, this paper presents three trajectories of laboratories. These include the services respectively led by P. Lepine and J. Monod at the Pasteur Institute, and G. Schapira's biochemical research unit at the Hopital des Enfants Malades. The three studies document the massive transatlantic circulation of materials, techniques, instruments, and people during the scientific reconstruction. The reconstruction however produced highly differentiated characters each operating in his own niche: the biotechnological inventor, the neo-clinician, and the fundamental biologist. The comparison situates the rise of molecular biology within the context of a rapidly expanding biomedical research system. It will help in understanding how, in contrast to the American situation, a logic of ''demedicalization'' became in France a means for developing biology at the molecular level. (shrink)

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. But it is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler's recent book, *Minimal Morality* seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel "two-level" social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant's categorical imperative (...) is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler's informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler's conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler's contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary. We show that the problem lies not in contractarians' immodest ambitions but in the modest resources rationality can offer to satisfy them. (shrink)

Construed metaphysically, the problem of individuation is the problem of offering an ontological assay of two entities that share all their pure properties in common so as to offer an account of what makes them distinct particulars. This article provides a survey of the major contemporary attempts to answer this problem. To accomplish this goal, the most important contemporary advocates of each solution is analyzed: the trope nominalism of Keith Campbell, the realism of D. M. Armstrong, the Leibnizian essence view (...) of Alvin Plantinga, and the bare particular position of Gustav Bergmann. As a secondary purpose, the article provides a brief critique of the first three solutions and a brief defense of the fourth. (shrink)

We isolate two abstract determinacy theorems for games of length $\omega_1$ from work of Neeman and use them to conclude, from large-cardinal assumptions and an iterability hypothesis in the region of measurable Woodin cardinals thatif the Continuum Hypothesis holds, then all games of length $\omega_1$ which are provably $\Delta_1$ -definable from a universally Baire parameter are determined;all games of length $\omega_1$ with payoff constructible relative to the play are determined; andif the Continuum Hypothesis holds, then there is a model of (...) ${\mathsf{ZFC}}$ containing all reals in which all games of length $\omega_1$ definable from real and ordinal parameters are determined. (shrink)

Of the early Roman historians who wrote in Greek, A. Postumius Albinus was not necessarily alone in realizing that his Greek was not the best Greek; while, on the other hand, Cato and those who followed the new fashion of writing in Latin would have resented, we may assume, could they have foreknown, the statement of Q,. Catulus in Cicero's De Oratore that they had no literary or rather ‘oratorical’ merit; though Cato might have approved Catulus' caustic comment on Roman (...) historical writing, ‘Satis est non esse mendacem’. That an historian should not, consciously and deliberately, lie all second-century historians would no doubt have agreed; and they would have endorsed Polybius' condemnation of masquerading as history in a story whose falseness was self-evident, because it assumed, on the part of the young sons of senators at Rome, a gravitas such as no young boy could possibly possess. (shrink)